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THE ADEMPTION OF LEGACIES OF STOCKS AND BONDS
"ONE must consider it in the same manner as if a testator had
given a particular horse to A. B. if that horse died in the testa-
tor's lifetime, or was disposed of by him, then there is nothing
upon which the bequest can operate," observed Lord Thurlow
a century and a half ago in Stainley v. Potter., Not that there
was a horse involved in that case. The Lord Chancellor was
deciding that where a bond, received as security for a debt, had
been bequeathed by the creditor in his will, and the debt paid
off before his death without the will having been changed, the
legatee of the bond should receive nothing in its place. A week
later, in Humphreys v. Hutmphreys,2 he elaborated his reasoning,
saying that "he was satisfied from the consideration he had given
the cases on this subject on a former occasion,3 that the only
rule to be adhered to was to see whether the subject of the
specific bequest remained in specie at the time of the testator's
12 Cox Eq. Cas. 180, 182, 30 Eng. Reprint 83, 84 (1789).
2 2 Cox Eq. Cas. 184, 30 Eng. Reprint 85 (1789).
3 Ashburner v. AMacguire, 2 Bro. C. C. 108, 29 Eng. Reprint 62 (178G).
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death; for if it did not, then there must be an end of the be-
quest ... and therefore that so far as the £2000 stock sold by
the testator in his lifetime, the legacy in this case was gone." 4
The words cast a new principle into clear form.0 Thereafter
the question of the ademption, or failure, of a specific legacy of
a security was to be a simple one of fact as to the existence of
the subject bequeathed, whereas previously the intention of the
testator had been an important consideration.0 The inclusion of
horses and stocks within one category had been easy and natural,
and the rule thus extended became the law not only in England
but in the majority of American states as well."
Lord Thurlow hoped, of course, that he had found a way to
-avoid confused and dangerous inquiries into the wishes of the
testator.8  The hope proved false. Too many cases arose in
which justice or the quite obvious intent of the testator demanded
that the legacy be effectuated although the subject was gone.
Clearly, it had always been possible to class many bequests of
that character with general legacies, which are typified by simple
4 Humphreys v. Humphreys, supra note 2, at 185, 30 Eng. Reprint at 85.
S It appears inchoately in Ashburner v. Macguire, supra note 3; see (1930)
18 CAL. L. REV. 711.
I At the beginning of the seventeenth century Swinburne wrote: ... , if
the testator ... unwillingly alienated the thing . . . bequeathed, this Is no
ademption ... unlesse... the testator did purpose by the same alienation to
take away the legacie . .. But if the Testator ... of his owne accord...
alienate the thing bequeathed . . . this is an ademption ... for it is suffi-
cient in last wils, for the revoking of a legacie, that the Testators mean-
ing do appeare even by an act, otherwise insufficient." SWINBURNE, TrSTA-
MIENTS AND LAST WILLS (1635) pt. 7, 192. See also Partridge v. Partridge,
Cas. t. Tal. 226, 227 (1736); Hambling v. Lister, Anab. 401, 402 (1761); 2
JARmAN, WILLS (7th ed. 1930) 1053.
Harvard Unitarian Society v. Tufts, 151 Mass. 76, 23 N. E. 1006 (1890);
see Shaw, C. J., in Richards v. Humphreys, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 133, 135
(1833) ; 2 PAGE, WILLS (2d ed. 1926) § 1335; of. Walton v. Walton, I Johns.
Ch. 258 (N. Y. 1823); White v. Winchester, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 48 (1827).
An ademption is sometimes said to take place when a legacy is satisfied by
a gift or advancement. More usually the word is reserved for the situation
which will be the exclusive concern of this note, that is, where the subject
of the bequest has been extinguished by alienation, destruction, or altera-
tion. See (1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 405.
8 In Stanley v. Potter, supra note 1, at 182, 30 Eng. Reprint at 84, Lord
Thurlow said, "I do not think that the question in these cases turns on the
intention of the testator. The idea of proceeding on the animus adimendi
has introduced a degree of confusion in the cases which is inexplicable, and
I can make out no precise rule from them upon that ground . . . I believe
it will be a safer and clearer way to adhere to the plain rule... I see no
end to the confusion arising from the following any other line." In Hum-
phreys v. Humphreys, supra note 2, at 185, 30 Eng. Reprint at 85, he ro-
peated it: "... . the idea of discussing what were the particular motives and
intention of the testator in each case, in destroying the subject of the be-
quest, would be productive of endless uncertainty and confusion . . ."
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gifts of money and are not subject to ademption.', Resort to
this expedient was difficult, however, because too often the will
referred plainly to the particular security. Moreover, it was
unsatisfactory because general legacies are the first to abate in
the event of a deficiency of assets. 1 To cope with the situation
properly it was necessary to resort to a new concept, that of the
demonstrative legacy.? Such legacies were held to be liable
neither to ademption nor to abatement ratably with general
legacies, and although a particular security might be referred
to, the reference was interpreted as a mere indication of a con-
venient fund.13 Since the testator's intent had always been the
basic factor in making a legacy specific,1" it then became possible
in many cases to prevent ademption by holding that the maker
of the will had had in mind a demonstrative and not a specific
legacy.5 But unfortunately for what was in substance a return
to the original considerations of intent in relation to ademp-
tion,16 the classification of bequests, though nominally referrable
to the testator's wishes, had long been a highly teclmical matter.' "
While that fact had been unimportant so long as the azim'.s
9 3 PomRoy, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 1132.
o 3 PoArmRoy, loc. cit. supra note 9; 4 SCHoLER, WILLS, EXEcv1oRS AND
ADMINISTRATORS (6th ed. 1923) § 3057.
1.3 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 9, §§ 1135, n. 2, 1136, 1137, 1133, 11:19.
32 The device originated in Roman law. See Walton v. Walton, supa
note 7, at 262; Walls v. Stewart, 16 Pa. 275, 281 (1351) ; 1 ROr% LEGACIES
(4th ed. White, 1847) 192. As distinguished from the ordinary pceuniary
or general legacy liable to abatement, it seeins to have been in some degree
of use by English judges at the time of Lord Camden's opinion in Attorney-
General v. Parkin, Ambler 566 (1769); at least it is referred to by name
and criticized by Lord Thurlow in Ashburner v. Macguire, supra note 3,
at 109, 111, 29 Eng. Reprint at 63, 64, and though repudiated by him in
Stanley v. Potter, supra note 1, it is resorted to again in Coleman v. Cole-
man, 2 Ves. 639 (1795), and by name in Gillaume Y. Adderley, 15 Ves. 334,
389 (1808).
13 See Walton v. Walton, supra note 7, at 262; Walls v. Stewart, supra
note 12, at 281; 3 PoMROY, op. cit. supra note 9, § 1133.
14 Pawlet's Case, T. Raym. 335 (1679).
15 Gillaume v. Adderley, supra note 12.
16 Speaking of the decision in Stanley v. Potter, sz'pra note 1, Chancellor
Kent said: "But I apprehend the words of Lord Thurlow are to be taken
with considerable qualification; and that it is essentially a question of inten-
tion, when we are inquiring into the character of the legacy, upon the dis-
tinction taken in the civil law, between a demonstrative legacy, where the
testator gives a general legacy, but points out the fund to satisfy it, and
where he bequeaths a specific debt. In Coleman v. Coleman, Lord Lough-
borough puts the question of general or specific legacy entirely on intention."
Walton v. Walton, supra note 7, at 264.
3. To illustrate, in Ashburner v. Macguire, supra note 3, at 111, 29 Eng.
Reprint at 64, the question of classification of a legacy of stock is dismissed
with the. words, "The testator says, I give my capital stoc to, etc., the
pronoun my has been relied on in many cases, in deciding the legacy to be
specific."
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adimendi might be resorted to as a secondary escape, the tech-
nicalities remained when the rule was changed, so that today
the effectuation of legacies of stocks is very frequently a question
of law, and of impossibly refined and contradictory law as well.1"
The present confusion in many jurisdictions is well illustrated
by the case of First National Bank v. Perkins Institute for the
Blind,9 decided last May by the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts. There the testatrix had bequeathed to her nephew
"all of my stock in the . . . Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey." This stock was callable at a premium and was so
called before the testatrix's death, in the course of refunding
operations whereby debentures issued for the purpose were sold
to New York bankers who agreed to give holders of the stock
preferential subscription rights. Because the debenture issue
was oversubscribed the testatrix was able to exchange only part
of her holdings for debentures and was forced to take the balance
in cash. After her death residuary legatees opposed the transfer
of the debentures to the legatee of the stock, maintaining that
the stock legacy had been adeemed, in which contention they
were supported by the court. The primary question of classifi-
cation is not discussed in the opinion; the brief remark that
"the legacy of the specific thing had been disposed of . . . "2
indicates the holding and suggests that the court thought the
law so clear that explanation was unnecessary. The decision,
if this be so, must be supposed to turn on phraseology, on the
fact that the word "my" preceded the word "stock" in the dis-
posing clause, for it is frequently held that such words make a
legacy specific.21 Yet if the testator had mentioned the number
of shares and omitted the single word "my" it is likely that
most courts would have considered the legacy demonstrative.22
It is highly doubtful that this sort of reasoning appeals very
strongly to the intelligent layman. He is likely to suppose that
is It has been said that the cases classifying legacies as specific or other-
wise "are . .. somewhat contradictory, run into nice and shadowy distinc-
tions,... form a complicated labyrinth ... and there is danger that a reex-
amination of them would produce more confusion than light; and instead
of illustrating, would obscure the question before us." In re Foote, 39 M1ass.
(22 Pick.) 299, 302 (1839).
19 176 N. E. 532 (Mass. 1931).
20 Ibid.
21 Ashburner v. Macguire, supra notes 3 and 17; cf. Tomlinson v. Bury,
145 Mass. 346, 14 N. E. 137 (1887) ; 3 Po=MEIoY, op. cit. supra note 9, § 1130;
1 ROPER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 204.
22 Tifft v. Porter, 8 N. Y. 516 (1853). Massachusetts goes even farther,
holding such legacies general. Johnson v. Goss, 128 Mass. 433 (1880);
Slade v. Talbot, 182 Mass. 256, 65 N. E. 374 (1902) ; of. Metcalf v. Framing-
ham Parish, 128 Mass. 370 (1880); Harvard Unitarian Society v. Tufts,
sup a note 7; Thayer v. Paulding, 200 Mass. 98, 85 N. E. 868 (1908) ; Boston
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Reed, 229 Mass. 267, 118 N. E. 333 (1918).
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the testatrix when making her will did not think of the danger
that the stock might be called, and that in any case she was
quite ignorant of what the courts would do if it were. Time
and again judges themselves have affirmed their belief that will-
makers are not aware of the doctrine of ademption. -3  Nor is
the rationale convincing that the use of the possessive pronoun
manifests an intention at the time of the will to give the par-
ticular thing mentioned.2' Such an intent is as obvious as it is
irrelevant; the single question of importance is: did the testa-
trix intend to give nothing else if the stock could not be given? -5
23 "We must hold the legacy . . . specific although we cannot but fear
that, if the testatrix had been fully advised of the consequences of maing
a legacy specific, she would have changed her will." Holmes, J., in Harvard
Unitarian Society v. Tufts, supra note 7, at 73, 23 N. E. at 1007. "It is
probable that he had no notion that, in case of the fluctuation in the value
of stocks, or from any reason, it should become politic to change these securi-
ties, the gift would thereby become extinguished." Johnson v. Conover, 54
N. J. Eq. 333, 340, 35 Atl. 291, 294 (1896). See Oliver v. Oliver, L. R. 11
Eq. 506, 513 (1871); Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Young, 101 Conn. 159,
369, 125 Atl. 871, 874 (1924). If there be any significant difference in this
matter between the knowledge of the general legal practitioner and that of
his client, it remains questionable whether the former is entitled to rely on
the risky technical shorthand when he can use plain English. See the
forms given in TucKER, WiLLs (3d ed. 1927) 252, 253.
24 "Although the testator may, at the time of executing the will, have an
article or articles of the same kind as that which he purports to give, still,
unless his language is sufficient to refer to, designate and identify the very
article itself as forming part of his estate, which he thereby gives, the
legacy is not specific, but general. Under these circumstances the word
"my" is often operative in identifying the article." 3 Po.AEnoY, op. cit. zvpra
note 9, § 1130. ". . : if - clear intention appear from the will that the
testator meant to bequeath the identical stock or annuities he vas posscsed
of at the date of it ... such intention will constitute the bequest specific." 1
ROPER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 214.
25 It would be difficult to overemphasize this point. Opposite answers may
be given to the two questions: (a) Did the testatrix intend to give this
stock? (b) Did she intend to give this stock oidy? The frequent failure to
distinguish the two is illustrated by the passage from Roper, quoted supra in
note 24, taken in connection with the following, also from the same author:
. ..if it clearly appear from references to the stock by additional ex-
pression [such as "my"] that it alonw was intended to be the subject of the
disposition, the legacy will be specific ... " 1 ROPER, op. cit. supra note 12, at
212. In Kenaday v. Sinnott, 179 U. S. 606, 21 Sup. Ct. 233 (1900), the
legacy was "deposits of currency entered on my bank book .... amounting
to $10,000 more or less." This, by the type of rule followed in the Pcrtdws
122stitute case, wupra note 19, would ordinarily be a specific legacy. 4 SCior-
LER, loc. cit. supra note 10. Before his death the testator invested the greater
part of these deposits in bonds. The court said, "... his intention was clear
that his wife should receive the anunt, and we are of the opinion that ve
ought not to defeat that intention by holding that the pecuniary legacy v:at
specific, and that the subsequent change was an ademption, and so a rule
of law rather than a question of intention." 179 U. S. at 621, 21 Sup. Ct.
at 238. (Italics the writer's.)
1931]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
It may be that the unreported facts of the Massachusetts case
were such that the result harmonized with the answer to that
question. Whether this be so cannot be gathered from the
opinion. Yet in the absence of good reasons to the contrary,
it is a fair presumption that ademption was not intended.2-
Since this problem of intention necessarily confronts the courts
by virtue of the very fact that an expression of will is being
dealt with, it is desirable to bear in mind the numerous avenues
of escape from the technicalities thought to have been control-
ling in the Perkins Institute case. Fortunately these technicali-
ties are but the remnants of a conceptualistic mode of thinking
that is fundamentally foreign to the modern outlook.21 For this
reason and because the purpose behind the development of the
demonstrative legacy has been incompatible with these rules,
they are more or less flatly contradicted by a number of other
principles which are likely to lead to their definite overthrow.
Insistently, for example, the courts continue to repeat that the
testator's wishes are paramount; 2_8 that the will is to be inter-
preted as a whole; 29 that constructions leading to partial intes-
tacy are to be avoided; 30 that there exists a "judicial bias"
against specific legacies2 1 Where these resources seem inade-
quate to avoid classification as specific, there remains a possi-
bility which is of particular value in dealing with bequests of
stocks and bonds, namely, that a conversion from one type of
security into another is not destruction or alienation but merely
a change in form.32
20 See Tifft v. Porter, supra note 22, at 521.
27 One finds the following, taken from Stanley.v. Potter, supra note 1 at
182: 30 Eng. Reprint at 84, slightly amusing: "As to the case of Attorney-
General v. Parkyns [holding legacies general] I collect from the note I read
of that case, that Lord Camden would have had great difficulty in making
those legacies contributory in event of a deficiency of assets; and if so I
cannot conceive how they are to be taken as general legacies for any other
purpose; they must have all the consequences of general legacies, or none;
they could not be specific to one purpose, and general to another. This I
cannot understand."
2$ Kenaday v. Sinnott, supra note 25.
29 Metcalf v. Framingham Parish, supra note 22.
3o Kenaday v. Sinnott, supra note 25.
32 Ibid.
32 This conclusion has been most frequently adopted where it could be
said that.the conversion was not initiated by the testator, as for example
upon the recapitalization, reorganization, or consolidation of the company
whose securities were originally held. Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Young,
supra note 23 (exchange for new stock of different par value); Goode v.
Reynolds, 208 Ky. 441, 271 S. W. 600 (1925) (consolidation); Johns
Hopkins University v. Uhrig, 145 Md. 114, 125 At]. 606 (1924) (stocks
changed into bonds on reorganization) ; Pope v. Hinckley, 209 Mass. 323, 95
N. E. 798 (1911) (stocks converted into voting trust certificates on reor-
ganization) ; Skipworth v. Cabell, 60 Va. (19 Grat.) 758 (1870) (state bonds
[Vol. 41
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It is likely that much of this confusion, resulting in part from
Lord Thurlow's attempt to apply an arbitrary rule of ademption
to all bequests of personalty regardless of the character of the
subject, might have been avoided had he developed more clearly
a distinction which he was on the verge of drawing in Ashburier
v. Macguire.3 3 There he said:
"By the civil law, it was competent for a man, after he had
changed the subject-matter of a specific legacy, to declare, by his
conduct, that such a change was no ademption. The case is put
of a gold chain, which the testator, after having bequeathed it
by his will, converts into a cup; the legacy is not adeemed,
because the cup might be restored to its former shape. This
has not been adopted by-our law... The gold chain may have
been given as a legacy, because it had long been in the testator's
family. If it be afterwards converted into a gold cup, the reason
for giving it ceased." -
There is a type of legacy then, whose subject may be a thing of
sentimental or artistic value, or of peculiar appropriateness to
the legatee: the rare painting, the library that typifies its owner,
even the horse that the legatee liked best to ride, in short the
chattel unique in greater or less degree. It is clear enough that
with such legacies the reason for the gift may cease when the
subject has vanished. But while all such chattels may be valued
for pecuniary reasons as well as for their uniqueness, it is usually
only the monetary element which is of importance with stocks
and bonds. Undoubtedly where the stocks bequeathed confer
control of a closely held private enterprise, the analogy to the
distinctive chattel may be compelling.2 In the absence of this
circu~mstance, as pointed out recently in the New York case of
Matter of Freenn,3 stocks, and likewise bonds, differ in no im-
portant respect from currency as media for the distribution of
estates. And ordinarily bequests which are definitely pecuniary
are considered general or demonstrative.? To regard a legacy of
changed to corporate bonds guaranteed by the state) ; ef. Re Peirce, 2:5 R. I.
34, 54 Atl. 588 (1903); Re Frahm, 120 Iowa 85, 94 N. W. 444 (1903).
See in general (1926) 11 CoRN. L. Q. 271.
33 Supra note 3.
34 Ibid. at 110, 29 Eng. Reprint at 63.
35 See Matter of Freeman, 139 Misc. 301, 305, 248 N. Y. Supp. 422, 427
(Surr. 1931). But ef. Pope v. Hinckley, supra note 32.
36Supra note 35.
37 See Hart v. Brown, 145 Ga. 140, 143, 88 S. E. 670, 671 (1916) ; 2 PAGE,
op. cit. supra note 7, § 1226. In Matter of Newman, 4 Dem. (N. Y.) 65, 67
(Siirr. 1886), legacies of sums "in government bonds" were held general. The
court said, "He simply gives general legacies of money, payable in a certain
1931]
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stocks thus, as essentially'pecuniary, accords well with the proba-
bility mentioned before that when one makes such a bequest he
intends, of course, to give the particular securities, but does not
intend that the legatee should receive nothing if those securities
should be disposed of.
Such an approach imposes no arbitrary rules. Presumptions
are important only where the testator's instructions are not clear
in view of the changes he has made in his property and only
because, in the absence of the testator, parol evidence is not to
be relied upon to explain his words. If the instructions are
really plain they will always control. 8 Even where they are
not, the general rule will often be modified by counter-considera-
tions arising from the situation, analyzed in the light of the
assumption that the testator intended "a sensible and equitable
disposition of his property." 3 That the particular combination
of parties and properties with which the court was confronted
has controlled the decision of many cases is plain enough even
though the results may have been expressed in legal formulae.
An instance is the recent case of In re Ireland's Estate.40 There
a legacy of stock was held specific and adeemed as a consequence
of the sale of the stock by a committee appointed when the
testator became mentally incapable. The court N ent on to say
that the wisdom of adhering to the strict rule of ademption was
clear because the testator could not have intended to hold the
stock for the benefit of the specific legatee, "a stranger," while
spending the remainder of his estate, which would otherwise go
to his children, for medical attention. It seems at least possible
that the results might have been different had the children been
the legatees of the stock, and the residuaries strangers. Thus in
Kenaday v. Sinnott, in which a legacy to the testator's wife was
held demonstrative and hence not adeemed, Chief Justice Fuller
said:
"The question then really comes to this, whether an irrebutta-
ble presumption arises that the testator, by reducing the amount
of money on hand at the date of his will, intended that the
amount of such reduction though remaining in his assets in an-
manner. The effect would have been the same if he had directed them to be
paid in gold coin, in greenbacks, in bonds and mortgages, in cattle, sheep, or
horses. All are nothing more than general legacies .. . It results that ...
the executor should ... invest that sum, so far as it will go, in government
bonds, and deliver the same to her. . .. It is, doubtless, competent for any
or all of the legatees, to whom sums are given, payable in such bonds
to take money instead at their option."
38 Potter v. McLane, 247 Mass. 387, 142 N. E. 49 (1924).
s Johnson v. Conover, supra note 23, at 339, 35 Atl. at 293.
0257 N. Y. 155, 177 N. E. 405 (1931).
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other form, should be distributed to his next of kin rather than
that his wife should receive it." '
Such instances could be multiplied. The circumstances most
usually relied upon, in addition to the character of the subject
separately bequeathed, as suggested in the Frecma case, and
the general state of the testator's assets, are that the legatees
as against the residuaries, or vice versa, are so related to the
testator by blood or other ties as to be considered the natural
objects of his bounty. 2 Elements such as these are certainly
more desirable guides in doubtful cases than the grammatical
minutiae of the will. Their use as the criteria of analysis directs
the judge's attention outward toward the world in which the
litigants live. Reference to such factors in the opinion makes
for a clarity not otherwise attainable. Explanations based upon
them are likely to prove as convincing, even to the parties to
the dispute, as are those drawn laboriously from the testator's
phraseology.
LEGAL PROBLEIS OF CORPORATE EXECUTIVE
BO NUS PLANS
ALTHOUGH the idea of compensation contingent upon earnings
is in itself an old one, its development in the form of predeter-
mined plans for the remuneration of corporate officials has taken
place, in this country at least, almost entirely within the last
twenty years., With due allowance, however, for the compara-
tive recency of its development here and for the lack of objective
tests, the experience of corporations which have adopted such
plans has been eminently satisfactory.2  The most significant
41Supra note 25, at 617, 21 Sup. Ct. at 237.
42Johnson v. Conover, supra note 23; Gillaume v. Adderly, supra note 12;
see Giddings v. Seward, 16 N. Y. 365, 367 (1857) ; Pierrepont v. Edwarde,
25 N. Y. 128, 131 (1862).
L See Taussig and Barker, American Corporations and thcir E..celutircs
(1925) 40 Q. J. EcoN. 1, 20. In Europe contingent compensation plans
appear to have been the accepted practice some time before their general
adoption in the United States. In Germany, for example, the Direktor fre-
quently received a moderate fixed salary, and a tlati'ie of 5% of net
earning after meeting all operating expenses, including interest on bor-
rowed capital, and paying a fixed moderate dividend on capital. Ibd. 43.
2In addition to thd universally expressed approval of corporate man-
agers, the mortality of such plans has been proportionately lower than
that of the more familiar "profit-sharing" plans for the rank and file.
The high mortality of the latter has been ascribed to the difficulty of per-
ceiving the relationship between the work of a subordinate employee and
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result of this form of contingent compensation is its approxima-
tion of the advantages of individual ownership and management
by identifying the interests of executives and stockholders in net
earnings.3 But under unfavorable business conditions abstract
advantages carry little weight with investors threatened with
diminished returns on their investment and aroused to something
more than academic interest in earnings reflected neither in
dividend payments nor in surplus reserves.
While the advantageous features of bonus plans have received
enthusiastic judicial recognition,4 courts have not hesitated to re-
view the fairness of such plans upon the complaint of dissatisfied
minority shareholders, despite the familiar doctrine that "the
majority must determine the policy of the corporation, with
whose internal management the courts wisely refrain from inter-
fering." 5 This attitude may be ascribed partially to the mislead-
ing effect of the use of the word "profit-sharing" as descriptive
of the device. Whether a given sum of money received by an
executive be called a share in the profits or compensation meas-
ured by such share inakes not.the slightest practical difference
to any of the parties concerned. But it is institutional in this
country that business profits should belong to enterprise, i.e., in-
vested capital, and courts have strenuously opposed any attempt
to dilute that interest.
A convenient basis for invoking judicial intervention is found
when there have been irregularities in the formal adoption of
the plan. Where it is instituted directly by the board of directors,
and the irregularity complained of is in such action, the possi-
bility of relief is limited by the fact that ratification of the action
by a majority of the shareholders, even after suit is brought, has
been held to bind the minority.7 But where the method of adop-
tion is such that by-laws, or statutes of the state of incorporation
require affirmative action on the part of the stockholders, insuffi-
the net profits of the entire company. See BALDERSTON, MANAGERIAL POFIr-
SHARING (1928) 19, 20.
3 Bonuses which are not the product of predetermined plans do not have
this effect, and will not be considered in this discussion. See Note (1926)
40 A. L. R. 1423, 1433.
4 See Putnam v. Juvenile Shoe Corp., 307 Mo. 74, 90, 269 S. W. 593,
596 (1925). Cf. Venner v. Borden Co., N. Y. Sup. Ct., decided Oct. 11, 1927.
5 Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N. Y. 121, 131, 105 N. E. 818,
821 (1914).
6 An alternative theory of profits would divide them between the wages
of management and the earnings of enterprise, omitting the category of
profits as such. See Taussig and Barker, op. cit. supra note 1, at 40,
7 Putnam v. Juvenile Shoe Corp., supra note 4. Cf. Gorrill v. Green-
lees, 104 Kan. 693, 180 Pac. 798 (1919).
[Vol. 41
COMMENTS
ciency in substance of the notice given to them has been considered
ground for interference.8
Equitable review has ordinarily been sought on the ground of
fraud, or breach of trust, although the probability of actual
fraud in the type of plan under discussion is slight. It is more
likely to arise in the case of a business partnership transformed
into a close corporation, where disagreement has disrupted the
former amicable association, and the majority, by electing them-
selves directors and officers, have attempted to distribute profits
to themselves in the guise of compensation, and thus to squeeze
out the minority. In such cases the courts have readily granted
relief.9 A similar situation would be presented ii a large corpo-
ration where the interests of the holders of a controlling block
of stock were adverse to that of the stock itself.
Objection has also been made on the ground that the votes of
participants have been material to the adoption of the plan.
Since officers and directors, with respect to the management of
a corporation, stand in a fiduciary relationship to its stockhold-
ers, such objection has been sufficient to warrant judicial investi-
gation, although if the plan is fair, the necessity of an interested
vote for adoption has been considered an "unobjectionable inci-
dent." 10 In a case of this sort, in the absence of fraud, ratification
by disinterested stockholders should conclude the matter, since
the effect of possible bias would thereby be eliminated," but it
has been held that even with such ratification, the plan is review-
able as to reasonableness.12
A more important criticism which has recently made itself felt
is directed to the secrecy surrounding the existence of most
executive bonus plans. "Full, free and frank disclosure .....
and to have the extent and method of future compensation fully
entered upon the corporate records is generally the better
s Scott v. P. Lorillard Co., 154 Atl. 515 (N. J. 1931). Statutory refer-
ence to bonus plans is rare. A Connecticut statute provides for their in-
stitution by the board of directors in corporations organized after passage
of the act, but requires authorization by stockholders in corporations or-
ganized prior to that date. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 3387. New Jersey
requires a resolution by the board of directors and approval by the stock-
holders. N. J. CoM.%P. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1925) § 47-783.
9 Schall v. Althous, 208 App. Div. 103, 203 N. Y. Supp. 36 (1st Dep't
1924); Carr v. Kimball, 153 App. Div. 825, 139 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1st
Dep't 1913), ajf'd, 215 N. Y. 634, 109 N. E. 1068 (1915).
10 See Booth v. Beattie, 95 N. J. Eq. 776, 777, 118 Atl. 257 (1922). But
ef. McKey v. Swenson, 232 Mich. 505, 205 N. W. 583 (1925). See Dowd,
Bonuses for C&7poratc Offlcials (1918) 86 CENT. L. J. 208.
11 See Putuam v. Juvenile Shoe Corp., supra note 4, at 97, 209 S. W. at
598. 0
12 Booth v. Beattie, supra note 10.
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course. ,3 In addition to the questions of sufficiency of notice
where stockholder action is required, such secrecy presents the
possibility of injustice to existing and prospective investors. A
financial statement showing net profits without indicating the
existence of a bonus plan presents a misleading picture, and
while legal responsibility for such statements is doubtful, there
are certainly strong arguments of policy in favor of requiring a
more accurate representation. 4
But on whatever grounds equity has assumed jurisdiction, the
reasonableness and fairness of the particular bonus plan com-
plained of must be determined to a large extent in the light of
contemporary corporate practice. Variations in the details of
such plans are innumerable, necessitated by the type of business
and the financial structure of the individual corporation, but all
predetermined plans include a decision as to who participates,
the extent of such participation, how the bonus fund is to be
determined, and what form its payment is to take."8 Illustra-
tive of such variations are three bonus plans presently in litiga-
tion-those of the American Tobacco Company,"' Bethlehem
Steel Corporation,"' and P. Lorillard Company.18
The limits of eligibility-for executive bonuses have generally
been specified at the inception of the plan, comprising those posi-
tions which contribute most directly to profits and losses. 9 But
13 Church v. Harnit, 35 F. (2d) 499, 502 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929).
14 See BERLE, STuDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1928) c.
IX; (1929) 1 CORPORATE PRACTICE REVIEW, 33 (No. 8).
Is An exhaustive analysis of a number of executive bonus plans is pre-
sented in BALDERSTON, op. cit. supro, note 2. See also SHARING PRiFITS
WITH EM IPLOYEES (1929), Policy-holders Service Bureau of the Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. for additional plans. The Industrial Conference Board, is
contemplating a survey at some time in the future to investigate the ef-
fects of business depression upon such plans.
'
8 Rogers v. American Tobacco Co. Suit was brought in the Supreme
Court of New York on March 12, 1931, but was transferred to the Fed-
eral District Court on the ground of diversity of citizenship, on April 4,
1931. The subject matter of the litigation has not yet been decided. The
plan appears in a pamphlet distributed to the stockholders by the com-
pany, THE AIERICAN TOBACCO Co. STOCK SUBSCRIPTION PLAN (1931).
% TBerendt v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 154 Atl. 321 (N. J. 1931).
A rgsum6 of the old plan is found in the opinion. A temporary injunction
was obtained in this action, restraining ratification by the stockholders on
the ground of insufficient notice of the substance of the plan. Thereafter,
on July 2, 1931, a substitute plan was proposed at a special stockholders'
meeting and since it was approved by the dissenting minority, the suit will
probably not be continued. See The Business Week, July 15, 1931, at I
and 8.
is Scott v. P. Lorillard Co., supra note 8. The plan is summarized in
-the opinion, and appears in its entirety in an appendix to the brief of do-
fendant-appellant, p. iii. A decision by the Court of Errors and Appeals
is expected early this fall. 0
" See BALDERSTON, op. cit. supra note 2, 30-46.
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since the tendency is to apply the plan to individuals rather than
to positions, there is usually a provision that the participants
be selected from the eligible group by a committee of the board
of directors. In the original Bethlehem Steel plan, the board of
directors were given the power to delegate this function to
the chairman of the board, and the latter in fact exercised his
discretion. This was one of the objections made by minority
shareholders, and the substituted plan makes approval by the
board requisite.20  The American Tobacco plan, on the other
hand, specifies all participants at the outset, and allows no dis-
cretion in the matter. The Lorillard plans, both that now in
operation and the proposed amendment thereto which has
brought it into litigation, give any member of the eligible group
the option of participating by the purchase of stock. The deci-
sion as to who is eligible to participate, or who actually par-
ticipates, except in so far as it might tend to indicate an obvious
lack of correlation with services rendered, is a matter solely be-
tween participants and management, and offers no ground for
complaint to dissenting shareholders.2'
The basis for apportioning the fund among the participants
is of importance in determining whether the plan is really one
of compensation, or is an unwarranted distribution of profits.
The two most generally adopted bases are the proportion of
the individual's salary to the total salaries of all participants, and
the appraisal of the individual's work by some group or per-'
son. 2  A variation of the first is the division of participants
into groups according to importance, and their subdivision on
the basis of salary.3 It has been suggested that since the ef-
fectiveness of the bonus depends upon a percentage proportion-
ate to salary, a more satisfactory basis would be the differential
between the participant's salary and a fixed minimum,-24 but no
plan has been found which embodies this suggestion.2 5 The
American Tobacco Co. plan provides gor 21/% of the fund as the
president's share, and a total of 71% for the five vice-presi-
dents. The former Bethlehem Steel plan left the matter to the
discretion of the chairman of the board as it did in the choice
of participants, but upon objection of minority stockholders, ap-
proval of the board was made a requisite here also. The extent
to which participants in the Lorillard bonus have shared has
no Since neither the chairman nor the members of the committee par-
ticipate, the change involves merely the question of business judgment.
21 Berendt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra note 17, at 322.
- See BALDERSTON, op. cit. supra note 2, 30-46.
Ibid.
24 Ibid. 93.
25 The average bonus amounts to from 15% to 100%, of the individual
salary.
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been determined by the amount of common stock of the corpo-
xation held by each, with the limitation that in no case could the
amount paid to any participant exceed a stipulated percentage
of the average issued common stock. The only change in this
respect contemplated by the proposed amendment is a lifting of
the limitation from 3 % to 71/2% for the president, from
2% to 5% for a vice-president; and from 1% to 212% for the
secretary, treasurer, etc. Very few plans, however, have adopted
stockholding as a basis of distribution. Where it has been util-
ized, it has been quite generally disallowed 20 by the courts since
"compensation must be a function of employment." 21
The mode of determining the size of the bonus fund has a
more obvious effect on the -interests of the stockholder. It is
usual to state the relation to net earnings, computed after speci-
fied deductions, and in some cases to fix either an absolute or
relative limit to the amount of the fund.211 In the American
Tobacco Company plan, 10% of all the profits in excess of a
fixed amount 29 is distributed to the executives.. Under the ori-
ginal Bethlehem Steel plan, after deduction for interest charges
and dividends on preferred stock, the management fund was
determined on the basis of 3.43% of annual net earnings, and
on a sliding scale upwards, as earning increased, to a limit of
8%. The substituted plan retains the same percentages, but
.provides for a further deduction from earnings for depreciation,
depletion and obsolescence. The existing Lorillard plan repre-
sents an extreme attempt to protect the stockholders' interest,
for after making all customary deductions from net earnings, it
requires an additional allowance of $1.50 per share on average
issued common stock, and 7% on its surplus and undivided prof-
its, before the 15% to bonus may be applied.", The proposed
plan would reduce the bonus percentage to 5%, but apply it
before allowance for common stock, surplus and undivided prof-
its, for the pertinent reason that the present plan has not per-
mitted any bonus payments for several years.31
On the questions of accounting raised by these plans the courts
t0 Godley v. Crandall & Godley, supra note 5. Cf. Nichols v. Olympia
Veneer Co., 139 Wash. 305, 246 Pac. 941 (1926).
. Scott v. P. Lorillard Co., supra note 8, at 516,
2s See BALDERSTON, op. cit. supra note.2, 30-46.
29 $11,369,000.00.
30 By-laws, article XII: § 2.
3' "For the past several years, this bylaw has precluded any bonus dis-
tribution and this has proven quite a handicap in view of the bonus being
paid by other companies. In this situation a division of such profits for
bonus purposes on a 5 to 95 basis between employees and common stock-
holders is suggested as neither unfair nor excessive." Letter of the Presi-
dent, February 14, 1931.
114 [Vol. 41
COMMENTS
have had little to say,32 although it has been suggested that, since
the funds should bear some relation to group efficiency, income
from a sale of assets should not be included.- The sliding scale
designed to give a higher percentage to management when prof-
its are greater has received judicial sanction." But the effects
of this device have provoked most of the objections to bonuses,
since a high percentage of abnormally large profits results in
what appears, absolutely, to be excessive compensation., Since
the element of predetermination in the plan is essential both
functionally, to provide incentive, and legally, to avoid the ap-
pearance of a donation,310 it would seem that a plan reasonable
in th light of normal expectancy of profits should not be in-
validated merely because greater profits were received than had
been expected. 37 There might, however, be a conflict of interest
in case of expafision thiough merger or consolidation, where in-
creased net earnings would allow larger bonuses irrespective of
the earnings per share.
The unique plan of one company provides for the payment
of the bonus in stocke and in addition measures the amount
so paid by the dividends actually declared on common stock as
well as by net earnings. The latter feature eliminates the temp-
tation to management, provided by the possibility of increased
earnings and a proportionately.larger bonus, to reinvest profits
in fixed assets without declaring dividends when the risk of loss
from the deterioration of such assets would fall entirely on the
stockholders. The use of declared dividends as a measure of
bonus payments may perhaps provide the final link in the iden-
tification of the interests of management and stockholders.
32 Cf. Ransome Concrete Co. v. Moody, 282 Fed. 29 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
33 See Berendt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra note 17, at 321.
3- Church v. Harnit, supra note 13.
3 It has been said that a large bonus and a small dividend is prima
facie evidence of misappropriation of corporate funds. See Shera v. Carbon
Steel Co., 245 Fed. 589,-591 (D. W. Va. 1917). A more significant com-
parison is the proportion of bonuses to profit. See Dowd, op. cit. st.,pa
note 10, at 209.
36 Cf. Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., sztpra note 5. See Note (1926)
40 A. L. R. 1423.
=7Cf. Ransome Concrete Co. v. Bloody, sazpra note 32; Seitz v. Union
Brass & Metal Co., 152 Blinn. 460, 189 N. W. 586 (1922). Such a result
would seem to be a logical implication of decisions holding bonus con-
tracts enforceable by the employee. Qf. Giveen v. Gans, 91 App. Div. 37,
86 N. Y. Supp. 450 (1st Dep't 1904).
38 Payment of the executive bonus is ordinarily in cash and the Beth-
lehem Steel Corp. and the P. Lorillard Company have adopted this form.
The use of stock by the American Tobacco Co. is not exceptional, however,
and is more in accord with the original theory of the bonus. Where st-elh
has been used it has normally been purchased on the open market to avoid
,the difficulties caused by the preemptive rights. See Frey, Shareholders'
PTeemptive Rights (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 563, 580. Where conditions have
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MUNICIPAL OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
MUNICIPAL operation of utilities is occasioned sometimes by the
absence of any private enterprise in the field, sometimes by a
frank desire for profits to alleviate the tax burden,' but most
frequently by the failure of commission control in combination
with franchise agreements to insure reasonable charges by pri-
vate plants. In the latter situation the usual practice has been
to acquire the private utility outright either through condemna-
tion proceedings 2 or under provisions of the original franchise
agreement.3 But when it is deemed unnecessary or undesirable
to eliminate the competition of private capital, the city is allowed
to build and operate its own plant in the absence of specific con-
tract provision to the contrary.4  Whether or not the private
competitor remains, the controversies arising from the opera-
tion of a municipally owned utility have most frequently cen-
tered about the relationship of consumer and taxpayer. And
behind the specific controversy lies the further and more general
problem of the relative advantages of exclusive control by the
municipality itself and complete or partial control by the state
commission.
been such that in spite of this difficulty a new issue was preferable, but
partial payment therefor was contemplated, the laws of some states have
necessitated the use of a third party in the transactions. See SIIAINO
PROFITS WITH EmPLOYEES, op. cit. sutpra note 15, at 14.
1 (1928) 17 NAT. MUN. REv. 447 gives an illustration of a town entirely
supported by its utilities.
2 See 3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911)! § 1313, 1314.
3In granting the utility the right to operate in the city, the franchises
have included clauses contemplating a return to public ownership after a
given period or at the option of the city. With regard to the interpreta-
tion of the various franchise provisions as requiring or merely permitting
acquisition upon adoption of municipal ownership, see 3 DILLON, op. ot.
supra note 2, § 1312.
4In Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 200 U. S. 22, 26 Sup. Ct. 224
(1906), the city covenanted in the franchise agreement not to grant the
right to operate a water works to any other corporation for thirty years.
Before the expiration of this period the city and the utility disagreed as
to price, and the former proposed to construct its own plant in competi-
tion. The court interpreted the clausq in the franchise not to prevent
such action, holding that the agreement was to be strictly construed
against the grantee. A similar interpretation was given to an exclusive
privilege of laying gas pipes in Hamilton Gas Light Co. v. Hamilton
City, 146 U. S. 258, 13 Sup. Ct. 90 (1892). But in Walla Walla v. Walla
Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 77 (1898), the city having con-
tracted not to build in' competition, was enjoined from building its own
plant until the contract was declared void by a court because of a breach
by the water company, although the breach had actually occurred. In,
that case the city reserved the right to condemn the private plant.
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Conflicting Interests of Tacr:payer and Cozsuizm
In view of the almost universal use of the products of a public
utility, the differences between the interests of the taxpayer and
the consumer are usually so slight as to make any discrimina-
tion between the two classes unimportant. Yet theoretically, and
in some cases actually, the consumption of the taxpayer bears
no relation to the taxes that he pays. From this disparity dis-
putes arise.
Of primary concern to both taxpayer and consumer is the al-
location of the capital charges of the utility. As a means of
affording the lowest possible rate to the consumer, cities have
frequently adopted the plan of paving off these charges through
taxation. Concerning the extent to which this practice should
be permitted, however, legislative and judicial opinion is not in
accord. In Utah, for example, a statute, providing for the issu-
ance of bonds by the city, stipulates that the interest upon the
bonds and a sinking fund for their redemption may be satis-
fied through taxation.5 On the other hand a statute in Montana a
and the charter provisions for the city of Detroit,7 require the
retirement of indebtedness through earnings. The Maine Pub-
lic Service Commission has held that the consumer must con-
tribute to the operating expenses, depreciation charges and a
margin to maintain a sinking fund for the retirement of out-
standing indebtedness.8 A middle ground has been taken by the
5 Utah Laws, 1925, c. 58. A subsequent amendment allowed the mu-
nicipalities, as an alternative, to set a sufficiently high rate to pay inter-
est and retire indebtedness. This statute was discussed in Logan City v.
Public Utility Comm., 72 Utah 536, 551, 271 Pac. 901, 9G7 (1928). The
case involved a rate war between a municipal and private plant. Tax-
payers intervened alleging that the proposed rates would not pay interest
on bonds or provide for their retirement and that the city had operated
at a loss for some years. The Commission found the rates unreasonably
low and provided for a higher level. It was reversed in the courts and
the commission was denied the power to fix the rates for a municipal
utility. The court instructed the commission that if taxpayers wished to
maintain their plant and operate at cost they should be allowed to do so.
Re Brigham Municipal Corporation, P. U. R. 1919E 339 (Utah Pub. Util.
Comm. 1919). The case held that interest and amortization of bonds
should be provided through taxation.
6The statute was discussed in Public Service Commission . City of
Helena, 52 Mont. 527, 159 Pac. 24 (1916).
7 See the discussion in Municipal Ownersip in Detroit (1923) 12 NAT.
MUN. REV. 523. Because of outstanding bond issues the street railroad
was forced' to liquidate one half of its bonds in ten years and was en-
countering some difficulty in doing so.
s Bonser v. Electric Light Comm. P. U. R. 1920F 183 (Me. Pub. Util.
Comm. 1920). See to the same effect Matter of Niagara, Lockport &
Ontario Power Co. v. Prendergast, 229 App. Div. 295, 301, 241 N. Y. S.
162, 170 (3rd Dep't 1930). The case arose upon the complaint of a pri-
vate utility on a cut in the rates of the Jamestown plant. The New York
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Montana Commission which has held that interest on bonds
should be paid from returns but that the bonds should be retired
through taxation.,
Where the municipally operated utility is free from bonded
indebtedness, it may, of course, provide service at cost with no
objection. The question arises, however, to what extent the city
may fix rates above cost and utilize the profits accruing there-
from to cut down the general tax level. Some municipalities
have been allowed a return equal to that enjoyed by private
capital, 10 but in other cases they have been limited to the actual
cost of production plus depreciation charges and a small surplus
to provide for possible losses."
A common ground of complaint on the part of the consumer
has been the utilization by the municipality of the services and
products of its own plants, as, for example, electricity for street
lighting and water for fire protection, without defraying any
part of the cost thereof. Commissions and courts have held that
such free service constitutes discrimination against the con-
sumer in that he is paying, through higher rates, for service
that should be furnished through taxation, and require that the
city must pay at least the actual cost of such service.' But if
the rates to the consumer are not raised above a reasonable level
and capital charges or any deficit in the plant operation are met
by taxation, free service to the city becomes largely a question
.of loose accounting methods. The taxpayer in furnishing capital
or funding a deficit is paying for the services rendered the city,
Commission held that it had no power to do more than fix a maximum rate
but was reversed on this point by the court, which, after laying down the
elements that should be considered in determining the reasonableness of a
rate, stated that city employees should not be allowed to work for the
utility without a charge being made against it. This is a common form
of discrimination against the taxpayer that has been forbidden. For a
discussion of the Niagara case, see Complaints Against Low Municipal
Rates (1930) 19 NAT. MUN. REV. 484.
9 Cavanaugh v. Whitefish Municipal Water Utility, P. U. R. 1922E 198
(Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1922).
20 City of Logansport v. Public Service Commission, 177 N. E. 249 (Ind.
1931) ; Re Gardner Electric Light & Water Co., P. U. R. 1920D 821 (Mont.
Pub. Serv. Comm. 1920); Cavanaugh v. Whitefish Municipal Utility, supra
note 9.
11 Matter of Niagara Lockport & Ontario Power Co. v. Prendergast, supra
note 8; Bonser v. Electric Light Commission, supra note 8.
"2Re Hammond Waterworks, P. U. R. 1919A 180 (Ind. Pub. Serv.
Comm. 1918) ; Re Village of Argyle, P. U. R. 1921E 265 (Wis. Ry. Comm.
1921). In Fretz v. City of Edmond, 66 Okl. 262, 168 Pac. 800 (1917),
the city was allowed to give free service to a state hospital. The suit to
enjoin the city was dismissed because the plaintiff citizen could not show
damages. The court considered that discrimination could only be enjoined
in dealing with a private corporation.
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although the charges are not carried in that way on the municipal
books.
Encouragement of industrial users by furnishing water and
power at reduced or even nominal rates has also been frowned
upon and price charges less than the actual cost of production
enjoined 13 even when the municipality has urged that the pres-
ence of the industry, through added taxable property and buy-
ing power, has more than made up for the loss of revenue to
the utility.
Since municipally owned utilities are granted tax exemption,
it is urged that in determining a rate level a sum equal to "Che
taxes which would have been imposed had the plant been pri-
vately owned should be included as an operating expense to com-
pensate the taxpayer for the loss of tax receipts resulting from
municipal oxnership. The Wisconsin Railway Commission has
uniformly allowed such an item,' while it has been forbidden
in Indiana.'s So long as its rates are reasonable, however, a city
desiring to carry such a charge for the benefit of its taxpayers
should be allowed to do so, at least in respect to local taxes. But
if the majority of taxpayers favor operation at cost, there would
seem to be no reason for forcing such a charge on the plant.'
Further problems are presented by the expansion of a mu-
nicipal plant to allow for service outside the city limits. Some
jurisdictions hold that without a legislative grant a city is not
empowered to serve consumers outside its corporate limits.1'
The majority of states, however, have granted this power either
by a general law is or through special charters.'0 The permissi-
"13Civic League v. St. Louis Water Dep't, P. U. R. 1917B 576 (Mo. Pub.
Serv. Comm. 1916). In that case rates below cost were enjoined as a use of
public funds for a private use. Cf. Re Hammond Waterworks, svpra note 12.
1ARe City of Milwaukee, P. U. R. 1927B 229 (Wis. Ry. Comm. 192G);
Re Village of Mlukwanago, P. U. R. 1922B 109 (Wis. Ry. Comm. 1921);
Re City of Hartford, P. U. R. 1919F 216 (Wis. Ry. Comm. 1919); Re
Board Water Commissioners of City of Madison, P. U. R. 1918F 75 (Wis.
Ry. Comm. 1918); see (1927) 16 NAT. IUN. REV. 733. It was shown that a
Cleveland electric plant carrying tax costs as a special surplus, decreased
costs and still made a better showing than competing private plants when
the size of their respective units were considered.
" City of Logansport v. Public Service Commission, supra note 10.
26 Tax exemption is granted to a municipality as an instrument of the
government. This is an advantage of public ownership that should not be
denied if the taxpayer is willing to support a public plant or at least lose
the tax returns from a private one.
',
7 Dyer v. Newport, 123 Ky. 203, 94 S. W. 25 (1906) ; 3 DILLON, MuNIcIPmL
CORPORATIONS §§ 1299, 1300.
Is By A. L. Buv. CoDE (1928) § 409, cities are authorized to own and
operate utilities in and out of their corporate limits, providing that their
rates cover interest on bonds and not less than 3W of principle. The cor-
poration commission is empowered to give a certificate of public necezsity
and convenience in case a private utility is already serving the city, and
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ble amount of this outside service is limited to the excess of
available power over local needs. Under the Michigan consti-
tution the amount that can be sold outside the city is limited to
25% of that utilized within.20 In Consumers Power Co. v. City
of Allegan 2l it was unofficially brought to the attention of the
court that the city intended to sell, through meters belonging to
outside consumers but located within the city limits, the excess
power to be produced by a proposed plant capable of furnish-
ing five times the city needs. The court, although unable to
make a holding on the point, stated that such a practice would
be enjoined under the constitutional limitation of the sale of ex-
cess power. But sale through the city's distribution system to
outside consumers of current bought from a private plant has
been held to be perfectly permissible.
22
The position of the outside consumer is complicated by the
various methods of financing municipal ventures, for where a
heavy burden is placed on the taxpayer by plant operation, a
problem of accounting is involved in placing an equitable charge
on the outsider through rate adjustments. With a self-support-
ing plant the charges to him will more closely approximate those
enjoyed by the citizen consumer and any increased cost of dis-
tribution could easily be determined and added to the rate' in
effect within the corporate limits. The rates must at least cover
the cost of service,23 and a larger return may be allowed than
in the case of a citizen consumer.2 4 A nice question is raised in
Western New York Water Co. v. City of Buffalo 21. where a large
industrial user of water operated its plant outside the city lim-
its but maintained its meter and pumping station on a lot within
the city and attempted to take advantage of lower city rates.
The court held that since the complaint was made by a taxpayer
in the absence of such a certificate no plant may be built. For a general
grant in North Carolina, see N. C. PuB. LAWS 1929 c. 285, § 1 see. 2.
19 3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 1299.
20 Art. 8, § 23.
21248 Mich. 34, 226 N. W. 680 (1929).
2 Holmes v. City of Fayetteville, 197 N. C. 740, 150 S. E. 624 (1920).
23 Where a city had bought a private plant operating in part outside the
city, and the part outside was operating at a loss, the Arizona Commis-
sion held that the city could discontinue that part outside its limits, The
commission held that a city may make up a deficit within the city through
taxation but could not do so for a venture outside the city line. Re City
of Phoenix, P. U. R. 1929D 497 (Ariz. Corp. Comm. 1929). For cases
contra see 3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 2123, n. 1.
24 In Squirrel Island Village Corp. v. Boothbay Harbor, P. U. R. 1919F
154 (Me. Pub. Util. Comm. 1919) the Maine commission allowed a return
of 8% when the service was given to an outside village. The same com-
mission held that 8% was too great a return where complaint was made
by a citizen consumer in Bonser v. Electric Light Commission, supra note 8.
25 242 N. Y. 202, 151 N. E. 207 (1926). This case was followed with-
out opinion in a case of the same name, 242 N. Y. 507, 152 N. E. 404 (126).
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who could show no damage or that service was being given be-
low cost, the city would not be enjoined from supplying the
water.
It would seem, therefore, that where there is no patent discrim-
ination in the distribution of the costs of producing services be-
tween taxpayers and consumers within and without the city lim-
its the municipality can operate as it thinks best.
State Versus Local Control of Mmnicipally Oivized Utillth :4
Although in a number of jurisdictions the legislatures have ex-
pressly excepted municipally owned utilities from the regulation
of state conunissions,2 the constitutional power of the state to
control such utilities has been generally sustained by the courts5
Granting the power, however, the wisdom of complete control
may be questioned. With policies involved in the operation and
financing of publicly owned utility plants in general by no means
settled, there are convincing arguments for allowing the voters
to determine certain of the policies that shall govern in their
own city. But there are other problems that are peculiarly
within the scope of state control. Uniform and adequate systems
of accounting are necessary in the construction of a reasonable
rate schedule, and experience in Wisconsin, at least, has shown
that the municipality is not always wise in its choice of account-
ing methods28 State control of this aspect of operation, in at
26 In Springfield Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Springfield, 257 U. S. 66,
42 Sup. Ct. 24 (1921), the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois statute ex-
cepting municipal utilities from state control which was attacked by a
private utility as denying private capital equal protection of the law. The
Court emphasized the voters' control of the municipal utility in holding
that the two types of plants were sufficiently dissimilar to justify different
treatment by the legislature. See Overton, The Regulation of Municipally
Owned Public Utilities (1922) 7 Coax. L. Q. 191; (1922) 20 MICH. L.
REV. 557.
27 City of Logansport v. Public Service Commission, supra note 10;
Pabst Corporation v. City of Milwaukee, 190 Wis. 349, 208 N. W. 493
(1926); 3 DmLLO-, Mu.NiCIPAL CORPOPATIONS, § 1324. In Town of Holyoke
v. Smith, 75 Colo. 286, 226 Pac. 158 (1924), the Colorado Utility Com-
mission was denied the power to fix rates of a municipal utility when the
commission was classed as a special commission within the meaning of
the state constitutional clause excepting municipal ventures from the juris-
diction of any special commission. Compare a Utah case to the same
effect: Logan City v. Public Utility Commission, supra note 5. Contra,
under a similar constitutional provision: Public Service Commission v.
Helena, supra note 6. With the exception of the Holyoke and Logan cases
regulation has been denied only because of limits in the powers granted
the commission, as interpreted by the courts. Kumm, The Legal Relation
of City and State with Reference to Public Utility Regulatioa (1922) 6
Mnirx.. L. REV. 32, and 140 et seq.
28 KIG, THE REGULATION OF MUNICIPAL UTILITIES (1921) 53-4, U007-8.
In a survey of Wisconsin municipal utilities it was found that few kept
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least an advisory capacity, has obvious advantages for the small
town which would be unable to employ competent rate experts.
Thus in New Jersey annual reports under a uniform plan of ac-
counting are made by the municipal utilities to the state com-
mission,29 though the commission has no power to control their
other policies.
Where the municipal plant gives service outside its jurisdic-
tion state control would again seem wise. In the absence of
regulation or competition the outside consumer is entirely at
the mercy of the municipal utility since he lacks the voting power
enjoyed by the citizen consumer. This situation has been rem-
edied in New Jersey 30 and Colorado-3 by allowing the state
commission, without power to fix the rates of a municipal plant
within a city, jurisdiction where the city serves surrounding
sections.
Even where a private plant is in competition with a city-
owned utility giving service outside the city limits, state con-
trol, although not so essential to the consumer, is desirable. Pri-
vate utilities might attack the constitutionality of the distinctive
treatment of municipal utilities operating outside the jurisdic-
tion of the operating cities with more success than was met in
the Springfield case, where the court relied to some extent upon
the consumers' voting power. 2  In fairness to private capital
and to prevent wasteful competition and plant duplication, the
state commission should be given power to control the extension
of service beyond the city limits by requiring a certificate of
public convenience and necessity similar to that required in the
case of the extension of a private plant. 3 If a private utility is
books and in many cases the stubs on the check books were the only mem-
oranda kept. In one case the records were kept in a vest pocket account
book. In a majority of towns no credit was given the plant for service
rendered to the city and revenue was placed in the general fund and any
expenses paid by appropriation. Such a situation would hardly exist in
larger municipalities.
29 In, In re Municipal Electric Plant, P. U. R. 1924E 156 (N. J. B3d.
Pub. Util. Comm. 1924) the New Jersey Commission enforced n anmnual
report to be made by city plants.
30 The New Jersey Board has jurisdiction over light, heat and power
outside city limits, N. J. COMP. STAT. *136, 3306 (Cum. StPP. 1925), but
as no grant of jurisdiction as to water had been made the commission
could not regulate water works outside city. Riverside Steel Casting Co.
v. City of Bayonne, P. U. R. 1926C 105 (N. J. Bd. Pub. Util. Comm. 1926).
31 City of Lamar v. Town of Wiley, 80 Colo. 18, 248 Pac. 1009 (1925);
Star Investment Co. v. Denver, P. U. R. 1920B 684 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm.
1919).
32 Springfield Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Springfield, suprat note 26.
Even if the constitutionality of such a distinction were sustained, which
is likely, the private utilities have a better ground for pressing its repeal.
33 Such a requirement is in force in Pennsylvania. Barnes Laundry Co.
v, Pittsburgh, 266 Pa. 24, 109 Atl. 535 (1920). Contra: Los Angeles Gas
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already rendering adequate service at a reasonable charge there
seems to be no reason for allowing a municipal plant to enter
the field.
Although the municipal plant should be thus regulated while
operating outside the corporate limits, no such policy is neces-
sary within the city. The majority of problems arising within
the city are questions of municipal policy, and in view of the ap-
proximate identity of interest between the consumer and tax-
payer, the franchise should be a sufficient guaranty of fair treat-
ment for both. Access to the courts would be sufficient to pro-
vide for any glaring inequalities. In the case of a private plant
operating in competition within a city the same safeguard is
sufficient. Where capital is provided through taxation the tax
exempt city plant, if reasonably efficient, should be able to under-
sell a private plant. This is particularly true when the taxes
of the private utility include a share of the capital charges of its
competitor and where the municipal requirements are filled by
the city plant. Under these conditions competition seems diffi-
cult and if the majority of voters are willing to shoulder a
greater burden to continue the operation under public owner-
ship no requirement for the continued competition of the private
plant appears. Were the state able to fix the rate level of a
municipal plant on a plane upon which a private utility could
operate on an equal basis, the lower rates available under pub-
lic ownership would be sacrificed. Therefore so long as the
rates fixed by the municipal utility do not conflict with charter
provisions 3- the state should not be allowed to interfere.
INTERPRETATION OF "AUTHORITY" IN SECTION 23 OF
THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRM1IENTS LAW
WHEN a representative negotiates a negotiable instrument with-
out actual authority' from his principal, the question arises
whether the negotiation is "inoperative" under Section 23 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law,2 or whether the connotation
& Elec. Corp. v. Dep't of Public Service, 52 Cal. App. 27, 197 Pac. 962 (1921) ;
Public Service Comm. v City of Kirkwood, 319 51o. 562, 4 S. W. (2d)
773 (1928).
34 Provisions similar to that of Detroit, su'pra note 7.
"'Authority, in the law of agency, denotes an oral or written communica-
tion from the principal to the agent, expressing an actual intention that
the agent shall act on the principal's behalf in one or more transactions
with third persons, or causing the agent reasonably to believe that such was
the principal's intention." A. L. ConniN, Comment (1925) 34 Y,%= L. J.
788, 793.
2"When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the
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of authority to negotiate is similar to that of authority to deliver
in Section 16, under which a holder in due course is protected
by a conclusive presumption of the validity of delivery. If the
former conclusion is reached, the lack of authority becomes a
"real" defense. If, on the other hand, the negotiation is not
wholly inoperative, it becomes significant whether the issue is
between immediate parties, that is, the principal and the trans-
feree of the representative, or between remote parties, the princi-
pal and a subsequent holder.
Theoretically unrelated .to these problems of the intrinsic
validity of unauthorized negotiations, but frequently confused
therewith by the courts is the question of notice of the irregular-
ity to the holder.4 In respect of this factor, a remote holder
appears to be in a more favorable position, the courts perhaps
being influenced by the fact that only the immediate party is
able directly to prevent the original misapplication. Thus where
a corporate officer with general power to indorse paper for the
corporation indorsed a check payable to the corporation and
deposited it to his personal account, the depositary bank was held
person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no
right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce
payment against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such
signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right
is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority." BRANNAN,
THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUIENTS LAW (4th ed. 1926) § 23. A proposed re-
vision of this section reads as follows: "When the signature of a person
is forged or made without authority it is inoperative to render him liable
or to transfer or to defeat his rights under the instrument unless he is
precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority." This prob-
ably would make no change in the law. See Turner, Revision of to Ncgo.
tiable Instruments Law (1928) 38 YAE L. J. 25, 40.
3 Section 16 reads in full: "Every contract on a negotiable instrument
is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the pur-
pose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate parties, and as re-
gards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery, In
order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the
party making, drawing, accepting, or indorsing, as the case may be; and in
such case the delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a
special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the property
in the instrument. But when the instrument is in the hands of a holder
in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to
make them liable to him is conclusively presumed. And where the instru-
ment is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears
thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the
contrary is proved." BRANNAN, Op. cit. upyra note 2, at § 16.
4 See Merrill, Bankers' Liability for Deposits of a Fiduciary to his Per-
sonal Account (1927) 40 HARv. L. REV. 1077; Thulin, Misappropriation of
Funds by Fiduciaries: the Bank's Liability (1918) 6 CALIF. L. REV. 171;
Scott, Participation in a Breach of Trust (1921) 34 HARv. L. REV. 454;
Comment (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 854; (1926) 10 MINN. L. REv. 611.
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to be on notice of a diversion of corporate funds.5 But that in
such a case the immediate transaction and not merely the form
of the indorsement constitutes the notice is indicated by the hold-
ing that a remote holder of an instrument transferred under
identical circumstances is not put upon inquiry.0
If the holder does not lose his rights to the instrument because
he is on notice, the next consideration for the court would seem
to be whether the negotiation was within the "apparent author-
ity" 7 of the representative. This issue would be raised, for ex-
ample, where a corporate officer with no real authority to
negotiate a bill or note, although officers of that type usually have
this power, does negotiate an instrument for his personal use
Weissman v. Banque De Bruxelles, 254 N. Y. 488, 173 N. E. 835 (1930) ;
cf. Santa Marina Co. v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, 254 Fed. 391 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1918), cetl rarl denied, 250 U. S. 643 (1919); Rice v. People's
Savings Bank, 140 Wash. 20, 247 Pac. 1009 (1926). Contra: Wheeler Motor
Sales Co. v. Guerguin, 16 S. W. (2d) 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). The Weizs-
man case is discussed in (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 855. On the conflicts of law
question also involved in the case, see Comment (1928) 37 YALE L. J.
803; (1931) 29 MICH. L. REV. 928.
6 Lasker v. Mutual Bank, 194 N. Y. Supp. 379 (Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd 201
App. Div. 333, 194 N. Y. Supp. 381 (1st Dep't 1922). But the form of the
indorsement may convey as much notice to remote as to immediate parties.
Epstein v. Chatham Phoenix National Bank & Trust Co., 1:38 Misc. 765,
246 N. Y. Supp. 321 (City Ct. 1930) (indorsement "for deposit").
7 "The term 'apparent authority' means that there is in fact no authority,
but that the conduct of the principal leads the third person with whom the
agent deals to believe reasonably that there was authority. In such case
the agent by acting beyond his authority has legal power to bind the princi-
pal." Corbin, op. cit. szpra note 1, at 794. See also RE srETE.'I, OF TIE
LAW OF AGENCY (Am. L. Inst. 1926) §§ 44, 47, 48.
s "Apparent authority" will depend largely upon the type of representa-
tive, and the powers which such a representative usually exercises. A
trustee, who is said to have "legal title" to the funds and control over
them, can validly draw a check upon the trust fund and deposit it to his
personal account, or perform similar acts which other representatives can-
not. Maryland Casualty Co. v. City National Bank, 29 F. (2d) 662 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1928); Newton v. Livingston County Trust Co., 231 App. Div. 355,
247 N. Y. Supp. 121 (4th Dep't 1931); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v.
First National Bank, 144 Okl. 180, 289 Pac. 749 (1930). See also 1 Monsc,
BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) § 317; Comment (1920) 35 Y,=,E L. J.
854. The distinction between trustees and other representatives is brought
out in two recent Virginia cases. Cocke's Adm'r v. Loyall, 150 Va. 330, 143
S. E. 881 (1928); W. L. Chase Co. v. Norfolk National Bank, 151 Va. 1040,
145 S. E. 725 (1928). See Comment (1930) 16 VA. L. REv. 401. There is
a presumption that the trustee will use the funds properly. Therefore, if
the depositary profits in the misapplication of the funds, the presumption
is overcome, and the principal may recover. Tingley v. North Middlesex
Savings Bank, 266 Mass. 337, 165 N. E. 119 (1929).
When a negotiable instrument is payable to a representative as such, or
when money is deposited by him in his name as fiduciary, it seems that he
has "apparent authority" to transfer the instrument or money by signing
as fiduciary, although he misappropriates the proceeds. Lincoln Oil Pro-
- 1931]
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If the immediate party knows that such officers usually have this
power, and does not know of the individual limitation, he should
be allowed to recover." The situation would be analogous to the
principal's giving secret instructions to an agent which a third
party is not bound to know.10 But where the immediate party
either did not know that the representative actually was an
officer or did not know that such officers usually have this power,
it seems that he could not recover upon any basis of reliance on
the appearance of authority. 1' And when he transferred the in-
strument to a remote party who knew nothing of the original
transaction, it seems that since the negotiation had never come
within the doctrine of apparent authority, the remote party could
not recover upon that basis.
If the transaction is not relieved of the effect of Section 23
by the existence of "apparent authority," it remains to deter-
mine what part of the negotiation was without real or apparent
"authority". In this connection, it is desirable to advert to the
dual nature of a representative's power to negotiate for his
principal and to divide it into the convenient categories of "sign-
ing authority" and "transacting authority." The former includes
the power, either general or limited, to affix the principal's signa-
ture to a negotiable instrument; the latter includes the power,
either general or limited, to transfer the instrument, signed by
the principal, or by a representative with "signing authority,"
to a third party.
The courts seem to be reluctant to extend the "signing author-
ity" of an agent beyond the instructions actually given. In Jen-
nings v. Manhattan Co.,12 for example, a representative was given
ducing Co. v. Clark National Bank, 35 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929);
Commercial National Bank v. Stockyards Loan Co., 16 F. (2d) 911 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1926) ; Baird v. Lorenz, 57 N. D. 804, 224 N. W. 206 (1929). See
McCollom, Liability of Banks Receiving Checks to a Trustee's Order f/M
Deposit to his Individual Account: (1911) 11 COL. L. Rav. 428; Comment
(1924) 4 BOSTON U. L. REV. 265; of. National City Bank v. Shelton Electric
Co., 96 Wash. 74, 164 Pac. 933 (1917). See infra note 21.
9 Cardwell v. Garrison, 179 N. C. 476, 103 S. E. 3 (1920).
10 Ordinarily "apparent authority" cannot be limited by secret instruc-
tions. 1 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §§ 710, 730-735, 1000.
,1 "Where a party accepting a check or note endorsed by an agent and
shown upon its face to be endorsed by an agent, maintains that the agent
had apparent authority to make such endorsement, he must prove that the
facts, giving color of authority to the agent, were known to him. If Such
person had no knowledge of such facts, he does not act upon them, or
part with anything on the faith of any apparent authority, and, therefore,
is not in a position to claim anything from such apparent authority."
Jackson Paper Mfg. Co. v. Commercial National Bank, 199 Il1. 151, 159, 65
N. E. 136, 139 (1902). See Brady, Forged Checks (1926) 43 BANKING L. J.
421, 422.
12 203 App. Div. 802, 197 N. Y. Supp. 401 (2d Dep't 1922); of. American
Trust & Savings Bank v. DeJaeger, 191 Iowa 758, 183 N. W. 369 (1921).
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"full authority" by a power of attorney to indorse the principal's
name to two drafts and to receive the money due thereon. The
representative indorsed and presented one to the drawee, who
paid him by a check payable to the principal. The representative
then indorsed the principal's name, indorsed it himself, and gave
it to his wife, who also indorsed in blank, and deposited it to her
account in the defendant bank, from which she withdrew the
funds. The indorsement of the principal's name to the check
was held to be "unauthorized" and void. Similarly, when a clerk
with instructions to stamp the principal's indorsement on checks,
which indorsement by its form showed that the instrument could
be used only for deposit to the principal's account, indorsed in
blank and diverted the proceeds, it was held that no rights could
be conveyed by such indorsement.'1 It seems then that where a
representative has a limited or special "signing authority," any
signature which is not made within those limits is "inoperative"
under section 23, so that even a holder in due course cannot
recover thereon.
"Signing authority," moreover, seems to be rarely implied
even from a broad range of other powers. For example, a sales-
man with instructions to sell goods and collect the price has no
power to indorse checks so received," and a manager of a local
business cannot usually bind his principal on negotiable instru-
ments."
Where the representative has general "signing authority" but
limited "transacting authority," three comparatively recent New
York cases illustrate the trend of decision. In the case of
Wagner Trading Co. v. Battery Park Natioial Ba?zk, 1 which is
followed by the similar recent case of TVissman v. Banque de
Bruwrelles,17 a corporate offider indorsed a check payable to the
corporation and deposited it to his personal account in the defend-
ant bank. The court failed to distinguish the separate ideas of
notice, "signing authority," and "transacting authority," but
said:
"Assuming as we do that Wagner had general authority to
indorse checks for the plaintiff's corporate purposes, clearly this
did not authorize him to indorse checks to his own order and
13 Strong v. Mlissouri-Lincoln Trust Co., 263 S. W. 1038 (Mo. App. 1924);
Standard S. S. Co. v. Corn Exchange Bank, 220 N. Y. 478, 116 N. E.
386 (1917).
14 Doeren v. Krammer, 141 Minn. 466, 170 N. W. 609 (1919); Robert
Reis & Co. v. New York Trust Co., 136 Mlisc. 141, 239 N. Y. Supp. 568
(City Ct. 1929); 1 DANImLs, NEGoTLABtl INSTRUMENTS (6th ed. 1913) § 293.
15 Dodds v. McColgan, 125 lisc. 405, 211 N. Y. Supp. 371 (Sup. Ct.
1925); Smith v. Thompson, 233 N. WV. 576 (Wis. 1930); MECHEMI, 0p. cit.
supra note 10, §§ 998-1000.
16 228 N. Y. 37, 126 N. E. 347 (1920).
17 Supra note .5.
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appropriate the money to his own personal use, and the nature
of this transaction was such as to warn defendant that the checks
were being diverted from usual business channels." 18
In Lasker v. Mutual Bank,", the corporate president and the sec-
retary, who had general power to indorse corporate checks, in-
dorsed one payable to the corporation in blank, then indorsed
it personally, and diverted the proceeds. It later came to the
defendant bank, which collected it for the third party indorser
who presented it. The court held that the bank was a holder
without notice and therefore entitled to the check. Similarly,
when a representative has power to indorse his principal's name
to checks in blank and to deposit them only in a specified bank,
his diversion of the funds does not impair the validity of the
endorsement.20 An analysis of these cases shows that in each
the officer had "signing authority" but exceeded his "transacting
authority." The immediate party, who was held to be on notice,
could not recover; the party who qualified as a holder in due
course did recover. 21
Thus the "inoperative" provision of section 23 probably refers
to lack of "signing authority," while lack of "transacting author-
ity" seems to be governed rather by section 1., where a remote
holder in due course is allowed to recover despite lack of delivery.
The problems arising from these cases, therefore, might be con-
cluded by the following inquiries: (1) Is the holder of the instru-
ment a holder in due course? (in which the question of notice,
involving his status as an immediate or remote party, would be
material) (2) Was the negotiation or any part thereof within
the representative's apparent authority? (3) What part of the
negotiation-the signing or the transacting-was without real or
apparent "authority"?
Thus interpreted, section 23 of the N. I. L. is in harmony
with the Uniform Bills of Lading Act. Under section 23 of the
latter act,22 it is provided that if a carrier's agent or employee,
18 Supra note 16, at 43, 126 N. E. at 349.
19 Supra note 6.
20 White-Dulany Co. v. Craigmont State Bank, 48 Idaho 100, 279 Pac.
621 (1929); McCabe-Hanger Mfg. Co. v. Chelsea Exchange Bank, 183 App.
Div. 441, 170 N. Y. Supp. 759 (1st Dep't 1918); Cluett v. Couture, 140
App. Div. 830, 125 N. Y. Supp. 813 (3d Dep't 1910), aff'd 206 N. Y. 668,
99 N. E. 1105 (1912); Salen v. The Bank of the State of New York, 110
App. Div. 636, 97 N. Y. Supp. 361 (1st Dep't 1906).
21 Compare also Merchants' Bank & Trust Co. v. People's Bank, 99 W.
Va. 544, 130 S. E. 142 (1925), and People's Bank v. International Financo
Corporation, 30 F. (2d) 46 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929), both involving the fraudu-
lent issuance by a bank cashier of certificates of deposit. In the former
the plaintiff, unable to prove himself a holder in due course, was denied
recovery. In the latter, a holder in due course recovered. In the Lasher
case, supra note 6, at 380, the indorsee was found to be, a holder in duo
course because "corporate obligatioiis frequently bear the personal indorse-
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who has actual or apparent authority to issue bills of lading,
issues one without receiving any goods, the carrier is liable to
a bona fide purchaser of the instrument. In other words, if the
agent or employee has "signing authority" but exceeds his
"transacting authority" the bona fide purchaser can recover from
the carrier.
ment of officers in order to give the instrument greater credit," so that
the indorsement did not put the holder on inquiry of the abuse of authority.
And -when the check is drawn by the officer to his own order, and then in-
dorsed by him, the same result seems to follow even as to an immediate
party. Havana Cent. Ry. v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., 198 N. Y. 422, 92 N.
E. 12 (1910); Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co., 234 N. Y. 394, 138 N. E. 33
(1923).
22 The first part of this section reads: "If a bill of lading has been issued
by a carrier or on his behalf by an agent or employee the scope of whose
actual or apparent authority includes the issuing of bills of ladings, the
carrier shall be liable to:
"(a) The consignee named in a non-negotiable bill, or
"(b) The holder of a negotiable bill,
"Who has given value in good faith relying upon the description therein
of the goods, for damages caused by the non-receipt by the carrier or a
connecting carrier of all or part of the goods or their failure to correspond
with the description thereof in the bill at the time of its issue." Section
22 of the Federal Bills of Lading Act corresponds with this. See Note
and cases collected, 4 UmFo t LAWS AxNOT.ATED, § 23.
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